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FOIA Exemption 3 and the CIA: An Approach to End
the Confusion and Controversy
INTRODUCTION
Public access to information controlled by the federal gov-
ernment is a recent development in American law. Enacted in
1966, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)' gives "any per-
son"2 an enforceable legal right to request disclosure of docu-
ments in the control of federal departments and agencies. 3 In
an attempt to balance a democratic society's need for informa-
tion4 and the government's need to maintain the secrecy of cer-
tain matters,5 Congress specified nine exemptions, detailing the
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). President Johnson signed the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966), on July 4, 1966; however,
agencies were given one year to promulgate FOIA rules and the Act was not
fully implemented until July 4, 1967. See generally Note, The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act of 1966: A Legislative History Analysis, 74 L. LaR. J. 231 (1981).
The Freedom of Information Act was not the first attempt by Congress to
provide a procedure by which agencies would disclose documents in their con-
troL In 1946 Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act, a section of
which required agencies to adopt rules by which the public could request infor-
mation held by agencies. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No.
404, § 3(a), 60 Stat. 237 (1946). Section 3(a), however, allowed agencies to with-
hold information that should be "held confidential for good cause found." Id.
Many commentators expressed dissatisfaction with the broadness of the excep-
tion and noted that little information was in fact being disclosed. See Note,
supra, at 232-35. See also S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
2. The Act is not limited to American citizens or even resident aliens. See
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (6) (C) (1982).
3. See infra note 34. While the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 es-
tablished a procedure for the public to acquire information from the federal
government, it gave the individual requesting documents no legal right to com-
pel disclosure in the courts. Thus, the FOIA is the first law to establish an en-
forceable procedure for attaining government information. See Note, supra
note 1, at 231-32.
4. Public disclosure of government documents has long been recognized
as essential to the maintenance of a democratic society. James Madison noted
that "[a] popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps, both. Knowl-
edge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own gov-
ernors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." Letter
from James Madison to W.T. Barry (August 4, 1822), reprinted in 3 J. MADISON
LETrERs AND OTHER W~rrMGS 276 (1865).
5. Many have recognized the necessity of keeping certain government
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kinds of documents that government agencies may withhold
from the public.6
Although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) can with-
hold classified documents under exemption 1,7 it can also rely
on exemption 3 to withhold documents that are specifically ex-
empted from disclosure by other federal statutes.8 In applying
exemption 3 to review Agency decisions to withhold informa-
tion requested under the FOIA, courts have struggled to adopt
a procedure that both upholds the FOIA's emphasis on disclo-
sure and protects confidential intelligence documents.9 In re-
cent years, several commentators have questioned whether
exemption 3 adequately protects information vital to national
security and effective intelligence-gathering activities.10 Con-
documents secret for security reasons. George Washington noted in 1777 that
"[t]he necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be fur-
ther urged. All that remains for me t6 add is that you keep the whole matter as
secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises of
this kind, and for want of it they are generally defeated however well planned."
Letter from General George Washington to Colonel Elias Dayton (July 26,
1777), reprinted in 8 WASHINGTON 4787 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1933).
6. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1982).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (1982). This provision exempts from § 552 matters
that are "(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order." Id.
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) (1982). See infra text accompanying note 24.
9. See infra notes 45-82, 108-19 and accompanying text.
10. Several commentators have expressed such concerns. See, e.g., Free-
dom of Information Act: Hearings on S. 587, S. 1235, S. 1247, S. 1730, and S. 1751
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 963 (1981) (statement of William Casey, Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence) ("My purpose is to bring before you the damage the Freedom
of Information Act has caused American intelligence and to urge quick and
prompt action on the proposed legislation by the requested exemption.")
[hereinafter cited as FOIA: Hearings on S. 587]; The Freedom of Information
Act- Central Intelligence Agency Exemptions: Hearings on H.R. 5129, H.R. 7055,
and H.R. 7056 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980) (statement of Frank Carlucci, Deputy Di-
rector of Central Intelligence) ("FOIA has called into question around the
world our ability to keep a secret. Its application in its current form to CIA is
inappropriate, harmful, and unnecessary in light of current oversight mecha-
nisms.") [hereinafter cited as FOIA: CIA Exemptions]; Cole, The Freedom of
Information Act and the Central Intelligence Agency's Paper Chase: A Need for
Congressional Action to Maintain Essential Secrecy for Intelligence Files While
Preserving the Public's Right to Know, 58 NOTRE DAME L REV. 350, 372 (1982)
("If the information cannot be classified as an intelligence source or method,
the CIA cannot exempt the information under section 403(d) (3)."); D'Amato,
The Freedom of Information Act and the CIA: How S. 1235 Will Enhance Our
Nation's Security, 9 J. LEGIs. 179, 190 (1982) ("Although the internal operation,
office management, and organization of the CIA could arguably come under Ex-
emptions One or Three of the Freedom of Information Act, neither provision
effectively protects such information.") (footnotes omitted).
Other commentators, however, have questioned the validity of this criti-
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cerned that a narrow reading of exemptions 1 and 3 by courts is
hampering the CIA in its intelligence-gathering functions, some
members of Congress recently have introduced bills designed
to protect intelligence information."
cism of exemption 3. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act Oversight: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 98 (1981) (statement of Edward Cony, Vice-President for News, Dow
Jones Publishing Co.) ("Given the breadth of the exemption accorded the CIA,
it is plain that the CIA is not shovelling out mounds of information unwillingly
as a result of FOIA requests by the Soviet Embassy or by foreign agents, as
some of the proponents of a blanket exemption for the CIA have appeared to
suggest.") [hereinafter cited as FOIA Oversight Hearings]; Intelligence Reform
Act of 1981: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 45-46 (1981) (statement of Mark Lynch, attorney, American Civil Lib-
erties Union (ACLU)) ("Now, the Freedom of Information Act, it must be
stressed, is of all the things that threaten the disclosure of information the one
that the CIA has the greatest control over. It has been emphasized throughout
the hearings that the Agency has never lost a Freedom of Information case con-
cerning classified information.") [hereinafter cited as Intelligence Reform Act
Hearings].
11. In 1979, Representative McClory introduced H.R. 5129, a bill that would
have amended the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403g, to
exempt documents that concerned foreign intelligence information and intelli-
gence arrangements with foreign governments. H.R. 5129, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). See generally FOIA: CIA Exemptions, supra note 10 (hearings on the
bin).
In 1980, Senator Moynihan introduced the Intelligence Identities Protection
Act, a bill that would have allowed the director of Central Intelligence to with-
hold sensitive information and counterintelligence documents. S. 2216, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
In 1981, Senator D'Amato and Representative Shumway introduced legisla-
tion that would have exempted from the FOIA all documents related to CIA
personnel selection and training, internal operations and management, and
clandestine and covert operations. S. 1235, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R.
4518, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See 127 CONG. REc. S5373-74 (daily ed. May 20,
1981) (statement of Sen. D'Amato); D'Amato, supra note 10, at 184-92.
Also in 1981, Senator Hatch introduced S. 1730, a bill that would have
amended several sections of the FOIA. Although the bill did not propose any
new exemptions for intelligence information, the Hatch proposal did address
the administrative burdens many agencies, including the CIA, arguably were
experiencing. The bill would have allowed each agency to establish a fee
schedule for processing FOIA requests. Agencies also would have been al-
lowed to extend, in unusual circumstances, the ten-day deadline for answering
FOIA requests, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1982), for up to thirty days. S. 1730 § 3,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See generally FOIA: Hearings on S. 587, supra
note 10.
Several bills have been introduced in the 98th Congress. On May 18, 1983,
Senators Goldwater and Thurmond introduced a bill that would have amended
the National Security Act of 1947 so as to authorize the director of Central In-
telligence to designate certain records specifying the operational methods used
by the CIA. S. 1324, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1983). All such designated docu-
ments would be immune from a FOIA search and from review by the CIA or
the courts. Id.
On April 12, 1983, Senator Leahy introduced a bill that would amend sev-
eral sections of the FOIA. S. 1034, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). One section of
the bill would require an agency to publish a list of statutes on which it plans
1984] 1233
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The debate concerning proposals to protect certain kinds of
intelligence information from disclosure centers on the effect
the Act has on the CIA's intelligence-gathering capabilities.
The Agency receives approximately 1500 FOA requests annu-
ally12 and has a backlog of over 2000 unanswered requests. 13
Some commentators note that the large number of requests
prevents senior intelligence officers who must inspect re-
quested documents to determine whether disclosure would
harm national security from devoting their full energies toward
organizing intelligence information for government policy-mak-
ers.14 Agency officials assert that the FOA requests have made
foreign intelligence sources reluctant to provide the CIA with
information because of fear that their involvement with the
Agency will be disclosed.1 Moreover, individuals advocating
restrictive amendments to the Act question whether intelli-
to rely under exemption 3. Id. at § 8. The agency also would have to describe
the scope of the information covered by each exempting statute on its list and
would be precluded from relying on any statute not on its list. Id.
Senator Hatch recently introduced a bill similar to the one he proposed in
the 97th Congress. S. 774, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See Hatch, Balancing
Freedom of Information with Confidentiality for Law Enforcement, 9 J. CON-
TEMP. L. 1 (1983). None of the proposed amendments submitted by Senator
Hatch bear directly on the amendment this Note suggests.
12. National Security, Law Enforcement, and Business Secrets Under the
Freedom of Information Act, 38 Bus. LAw. 707, 713 (1983) (statement of Stanley
Sporkin, CIA general counsel, at program presented at ABA annual meeting on
August 10, 1983) [hereinafter cited as National Security].
13. See FOIA: CIA Exemptions, supra note 10, at 29 (statement of Frank
Carlucci, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence).
14. See D'Amato, supra note 10, at 184; Cole, supra note 10, at 359-62. See
also S. 1324, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (4) (1983); National Security, supra note
12, at 717 (statement of Morton Halperin, director of Center for National Secur-
ity Studies).
15. See Cole, supra note 10, at 358-9. In 1980, Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence Carlucci testified:
Although we assure these individuals that their information is and
will continue to be well protected, we have on record numerous cases
where our assurances have not sufficed. Foreign agents, some very im-
portant, have either refused to accept or have terminated a relationship
on the grounds that, in their minds-and it is unimportant whether
they are right or not-but in their minds the CIA is no longer able to
absolutely guarantee that information which they provide the U.S. Gov-
ernment is sacrosanct. Again, we believe we can keep it so, but it is, in
the final analysis, their perception-not ours-which counts.
FOIA: CIA Exemptions, supra note 10, at 26.
ACLU attorney Mark Lynch presented a different view:
So I think this perception problem has to be put into perspective.
There really are far many more factors, far more important factors, far
more weighty factors than the Freedom of Information Act that lead a
foreign service or foreign source to decline to cooperate with the CIA.
The Freedom of Information Act in my view is at the bottom of the bar-
rel of problems in this perception area.
Intelligence Reform Act Hearings, supra note 10, at 46. See also FOIA: CIA Ex-
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gence information disclosed under the Act actually contributes
anything to public discussion of foreign affairs and national
security.16
This Note analyzes the differing standards of review ap-
plied by courts when the CIA withholds documents under ex-
emption 3 of the FOIA. Part I examines the language and
legislative history of exemption 3. Part II studies the judicial
application of exemption 3 in cases in which the CIA has ac-
knowledged the existence of documents requested and con-
cludes that the conflicting approaches established by courts
have led to disparate results. Part II considers application of
the exemption in cases in which the CIA has refused to confirm
or deny the existence of documents requested. In this context
as well, the conflicting approaches have led to confusion. Part
emptions, supra note 10, at 107 (report prepared by Center for National Secur-
ity Studies).
16. The "Findings and Purposes" section of S. 1324, the bill authored by
Senators Goldwater and Thurmond, states that "information concerning the
means by which intelligence is gathered generally is not necessary for public
debate on the defense and foreign policies of the United States." S. 1324, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (9) (1983).
Critics of proposals to restrict the FOTA, however, point out that informa-
tion made available under the Act has, on several occasions, disclosed illegal
and unethical activities by the Agency. See Intelligence Reform Act Hearings,
supra note 10, at 38 (statement of K. Prescott Low, Publisher of the Quincy Pa-
triot Ledger). CIA documents released under the Act that suggest illegal or un-
ethical activities of the Agency include:
(1) Files from May 1970 to May 1973 compiled by the Agency as a result of
a directive from James Schlesinger, Director of Central Intelligence, requesting
employees to report Agency activities that may be in violation of the CIA char-
ter. The files document various "questionable" activities of the CIA, including
its surveillance of American citizens in the United States, its arrangements
with American businesses, and its assistance to local police. See FOIA Over-
sight Hearings, supra note 10, at 714 (app., statement of ACLU attorneys John
Shattuck and Allan Adler).
(2) A collection of documents detailing CIA projects relating to drug exper-
iments and behavior modification tests conducted in the late 1950s and early
1960s. Some of the experiments included the administering of chemical and bi-
ological substances to human beings, some of whom were unwitting partici-
pants in the testing. At least one person died as a result of the experiments.
See id. at 715.
(3) Information regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and possible "Castro Cuban
involvement in the John F. Kennedy assassination." See id.
(4) Documents concerning the CIA's mail opening project in the early
1970s. One memorandum explains that the United States postal service and
FBI worked with the CIA in conducting the project. See id.
(5) Documents regarding the CIA's investigation of the disappearance of
Dr. Riha, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Czechoslovakia who was teaching at
the University of Colorado. The documents include the written statement of
William Colby before the Senate Intelligence Committee explaining the role of
the CIA in the investigation of the disappearance, which was a domestic con-
cern and therefore outside of the Agency's charter. See id.
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IV proposes an amendment to the FOIA that would allow
courts, in both types of exemption 3 cases, effectively to over-
see CIA decisions concerning requested information while still
protecting vital intelligence information.
I. FOIA EXEMPTION 3
Unlike the other eight exemptions to the FOIA,'7 exemp-
tion 3 does not itself detail the types of documents that it ex-
empts from disclosure. Rather, as originally enacted in 1966,
exemption 3 protected documents "specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute."' 8 The United States Supreme Court
construed this language broadly in FAA Administrator v. Rob-
ertson,'9 holding that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,20 which
gives the Federal Aviation Administration considerable discre-
tion to withhold agency records from disclosure, 21 qualified as
an exempting statute.22 In reaction to Robertson, Congress
modified exemption 3 to narrow the range of statutes that fall
within the scope of the exemption.23 Exemption 3 now pro-
vides that the FOIA is inapplicable to matters that are
17. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
18. Pub. L. No. 89-487, § 3(e) (3), 80 Stat. 250, 251 (1966); see 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (3) (1970).
19. 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
20. 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (Supp. V 1981).
21. The statute allowed the administrator or the board of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration to withhold agency documents upon the application of
"any person" requesting information if, in the administrator's or board's judg-
ment, "a disclosure of such information would adversely affect the interests of
such person and is not required in the interest of the public." Id.
22. After studying the legislative history of the exemption, the Court noted
that the extensive power to withhold documents conferred on the FAA by Con-
gress in the 1958 Act did not conflict with the congressional intent to enact nar-
row exemptions to the FOIA. 422 U.S. at 266. Rejecting the contention that
Congress intended the FOIA to repeal by implication prior statutes granting
specific agencies the discretion to withhold information, the Court found that
the FAA provision at issue fell within the scope of exemption 3. Id. at 266-67.
23. Section 5 of the Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90
Stat. 1241 (1976), amended the terms of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2) (1970). The House
Committee on Government Operations explained:
Believing that the decision misconceives the intent of exemption (3),
the committee recommends that the exemption be amended to exempt
only material required to be withheld from the public by any statute
establishing particular criteria or referring to particular types of infor-
mation. The committee is of the opinion that this change would elimi-
nate the gap created in the Freedom of Information Act by the
Robertson case without in any way endangering statutes such as the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2161-6, which provides explicitly
for the protection of certain nuclear data.
H.R. REP. No. 880, pt. 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2183, 2204-05.
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specifically exempted from disclosure by statute .... provided that
such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public
in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) estab-
lishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of
matters to be withheld.2 4
Although exemption 1 shields classified documents in con-
trol of the CIA, the Agency also possesses much unclassified
information and frequently invokes exemption 3 to protect such
information from disclosure. When invoking exemption 3, the
CIA typically relies on either the National Security Act of
194725 or the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.26 The Na-
tional Security Act provides that "the Director of Central Intel-
ligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources 27 and methods from unauthorized disclosure." 28 In fur-
therance of this duty to protect agency sources and methods,
the Director also has the power, under the Central Intelligence
Agency Act, to withhold information regarding "[t] he organiza-
tion, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of
personnel employed by the Agency."29
The legislative history of exemption 3 supports the CIA's
claim that the National Security Act and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency Act qualify as "exempting statutes." The Confer-
ence Report accompanying the 1974 FOIA amendments
specifically acknowledged that the two laws were exempting
statutes for purposes of exemption 3.30 Furthermore, during
the consideration of the 1976 amendment to exemption 3 in the
House of Representatives, the sponsor of the amendment ob-
served that the Central Intelligence Agency Act met the re-
quirements of the revised exemption.3 1 Finally, the House
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) (1982).
25. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d) (3) (1976).
26. 50 U.S.C. § 403g (1976).
27. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
defined "intelligence source" as "a person or institution that provides, has pro-
vided, or has been engaged to provide the CIA with information of a kind the
Agency needs to perform its intelligence function effectively, yet could not rea-
sonably expect to obtain without guaranteeing the confidentiality of those who
provide it." Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1980). But see Sims v. CIA,
709 F.2d 95, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (reaffirming definition in earlier Sims case), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 1438 (1984).
28. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976).
29. 50 U.S.C. § 403g (1976).
30. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974) states that "in-
telligence sources and methods (50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3) and (g)), for example, may
be classified and exempted under section 552(b) (3) of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act."
31. During congressional debate on the Government in the Sunshine Act,
Representative Bella Abzug, its primary sponsor, stated: "I have been asked
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Judiciary Committee, in recommending passage of the same
amendment, noted that the National Security Act also qualified
as an exempting statute.32 In light of this legislative history,
courts consistently have held that both statutes "refer to partic-
ular types of matters to be withheld" and thus qualify as ex-
empting statutes.33
When hearing appeals from CIA decisions to withhold doc-
uments on exemption 3 grounds,34 courts review Agency deci-
sions de novo,35 as mandated by the Act.36 The Senate
whether 50 U.S.C. § 403g, a statute relating to CIA exemption from laws such as
the Sunshine Act and the Freedom of Information Act, comes within the third
exemption as recommended by the conference. I have examined section 403g
and believe that it does come within the exemption." 122 CONG. REC. 28,473
(1976) (statement of Rep. Abzug).
32. H.R. REP. No. 880, pt. I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 n.2, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2212, 2225. The judiciary committee noted: 'This
would clarify the fact that statutes such as 50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3) concerning se-
curity information and 8 U.S.C. 222 concerning confidential records of the State
Department concerning visas and related matters, are included."
33. See Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (the CIA Act and
the National Security Act are both exempting statutes), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
927 (1980); National Com'n on Law Enforcement v. CIA, 576 F.2d 1373, 1375-76
(9th Cir. 1978) (same); Marks v. CIA, 590 F.2d 997, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (the
National Security Act is an exempting statute); Phillipi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009,
1015 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (both Acts are exempting statutes); Weissman v. CIA,
565 F.2d 692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (the CIA Act is an exempting statute); Baker v.
CIA, 565 F. Supp. 664, 667 (D.D.C. 1978) (same); Fonda v. CIA, 434 F. Supp. 498,
504 (D.D.C. 1977) (the National Security Act is an exempting statute).
Several commentators also have concluded that the two statutes meet the
requirements of the revised exemption. See, e.g., O'REiLLY, FEDERAL INFORMA-
TION DiscLOsuRE 13.07 (1981) ("Since the CIA enabling statute mandates the
withholding of CIA information by its Director, this mandatory statute bars dis-
closure under either the original or revised versions of exemption (b) (3).")
(footnotes omitted); Note, The Effects of the 1976 Amendment to Exemption 3 of
the Freedom of Information Act; 76 COLuM. L. REV. 1029, 1044 n.91 (1976) ("Sec-
tion 403g of title 50 of the United States Code, mentioned by Representative
Abzug as an example of a statute that would qualify under exemption three,
also seems to specify the particular types of matter to be withheld.").
34. A request under the FOIA must reasonably describe the records
sought and be in accordance with the agency rules detailing the time, place,
fees, and other FOIA procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1982). The agency
must respond within ten working days of receiving the request by either grant-
ing or denying the entire request. Id. at (a) (6) (A) (i). If the request is denied
and the person requesting the documents appeals the decision, the agency has
twenty days after the appeal is received to rule on it. Id. at (a) (6) (A) (ii). If
the denial is affirmed on administrative appeal, the person seeking disclosure
can file suit in the federal district court "in the district in which the complain-
ant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency
records are situated, or in the District of Columbia" to enjoin the agency from
withholding the requested documents and to compel their production. Id. at
(a) (4) (B). See also O'REi.LY, supra note 33, at chs. 7-8.
35. "De novo" means "anew; afresh; a second time." BLAcK's LAw DIcTION-
ARY 483 (5th ed. 1979). See also infra note 86 and accompanying text.
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (1982).
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Judiciary Committee, in reporting the FOIA out of committee
in 1965, noted that de novo review of agency refusals to disclose
information was necessary "to prevent proceedings from be-
coming meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discre-
tion."3 7 The Conferees to the 1974 FOIA amendments
explained the de novo review in more detail, stating that,
before conducting in camera inspection of withheld agency
records, courts should give the agency an opportunity to prove
by detailed affidavits or testimony that the documents are
clearly exempt.3 8 The Act places the burden of justifying deci-
sions to withhold information on the government3 9 and pro-
vides that the agency must disclose any portion of a document
that is "reasonably segregable" from the exempted part.40
Although the legislative history of the FOIA clearly indi-
cates Congress's intent to include the National Security Act
and the Central Intelligence Agency Act as exempting statutes
within the meaning of exemption 3, the Act offers little insight
into how a court should conduct a de novo review of an agency
decision to withhold documents based on one of these stat-
utes.41 As a result, courts, while applying ostensibly the same
de novo review standard, have exhibited varying degrees of def-
erence to CIA decisions.42 This inconsistency arises in two dis-
tinct types of exemption 3 cases: (1) cases in which the
Agency acknowledges the existence of requested documents
but refuses to disclose them,43 and (2) cases in which the
Agency refuses to acknowledge the existence of requested
documents.44
37. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965). As the committee elabo-
rated, "That the proceeding must be de novo is essential in order that the ulti-
mate decision as to the propriety of the agency's action is made by the court."
Id.
38. S. CoNF. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6285, 6287-88. The provision as enacted provides sim-
ply that courts may "examine the contents of such agency records in camera to
determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld." 5
U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (1982).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (1982).
40. Id. § 552(b).
41. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
42. Chief Judge Wright has observed: "Persistent controversy has sur-
rounded the question whether FOIA cases involving national security claims
should be treated differently from other FOIA cases. Arguments have focused
on the proper standard of judicial review and on the use of certain tech-
niques-primarily in camera inspection-in the review process." Ray v. Tur-
ner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
43. See infra notes 45-82 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 108-19 and accompanying text. The problem of courts'
exhibiting varying degrees of deference to agency decisions while purporting to
1984] 1239
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II. CASES IN WHICH THE CIA ACKNOWLEDGES THE
EXISTENCE OF THE DOCUMENTS REQUESTED
A. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF EXEMPTION 3
Since the passage of the FOIA, courts reviewing Agency
decisions have adopted varying degrees of deference under ex-
emption 3.45 Some courts have emphasized the unique nature
of the exemption and, as a result, have summarily upheld
Agency decisions without scrutinizing the factual basis for the
claimed exemption.4 6 Conversely, other courts have rejected
the notion that exemption 3 entails a less detailed review than
do other exemptions and have required the CIA to explain the
factual basis for its exemption claims.4 7
apply the same standard of review is not confined to cases arising under the
FOIA; it is recognized as plaguing many areas throughout administrative law.
For example, in a case involving FCC licensing procedures, Circuit Judge
Leventhal explained:
There was once a day when a court upheld the "sensible judg-
ments" of a board, say of tax assessors, on the ground that they "ex-
press an intuition of experience which outruns analysis." There may
still exist narrow areas where this approach persists, partly for historic
reasons.
Generally, however, the applicable doctrine that has evolved with
the enormous growth and significance of administrative determination
in the past forty or fifty years has insisted on reasoned decision-mak-
ing. The requirement of reasoned decision-making is under great ten-
sion when a certificating agency is required to choose between two or
more applicants endowed with virtually equivalent qualifications. But
at least so long as government uses the forms of adjudication, ... rea-
soned decision-making remains a requirement of our law.
444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (footnotes omitted).
45. O'Reilly characterizes the distinctive degrees of deference in terms of a
conflict in the "standard of proof' among the circuits:
Counsel seeking documents from the CIA would be well advised to
do some forum-shopping since the agency is held to a much higher
standard of proof in the Washington courts than in other circuits. The
Ninth Circuit has indicated willingness to accept statutory exemption
claims by the agency on the face of sufficient affidavits, while the D.C.
Circuit has been less receptive and more curious about the actual
harms to the agency which disclosure would create. An affidavit which
is suitable for one court is not suitable for the other, as the CIA may
have learned in several of the D.C. Circuit cases.
O'REILLY, supra note 33, at 13.07 (footnotes omitted).
46. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 59-82 and accompanying text. See also Phillipi v. CIA,
(1980 Transfer Binder] Gov'T DIscLosURE (P-H) 80,188, at 80,464 (D.D.C. June
10, 1980), aFd, 655 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court in Phillipi remarked:
An unrestricted reading of this statute [the National Security Act]
would, however, permit the CIA to withhold a broad range of informa-
tion regardless of any actual need for maintaining its secrecy. While it
is by no means obvious or required on the face of the statute, the
courts have apparently imposed an additional requirement that the dis-
closure of the request[ed] information would pose a risk of some harm
to the national security .... This requirement is born of an apprehen-
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Courts emphasizing the difference between exemption 3
and the other eight exemptions pattern their approach after a
passage from Justice Stewart's concurrence in EPA v. Mink48
which suggested that, under exemption 3, "the only 'matter' to
be determined in a district court's de novo inquiry is the fac-
tual existence of a statute, regardless of how unwise, self-pro-
tective, or inadvertent, the enactment might be."49 In Goland v.
CIA,50 for instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a summary judgment for
the CIA based on Agency affidavits attesting that the deleted
portions of documents contained descriptions of (1) "intelli-
gence collection and operational devices ... still utilized," (2)
"methods of procurement and supply," (3) "basic concepts of
intelligence methodology," (4) "specific clandestine intelligence
operations," and (5) "certain intelligence methodologies of a
friendly foreign government."5 ' The court of appeals suggested
sion that a statute as potentially expansive as 50 U.S.C. § 403(d) (3)
[the National Security Act] could significantly frustrate the Congres-
sional policy in favor of disclosure expressed in the FOIA without ad-
vancing any countervailing interest in the continuing effectiveness of
intelligence operations.
Id. at 80,466 (citations omitted).
48. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
49. Id. at 95 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring). With regard to the Mink deci-
sion, the conference committee for the 1974 FOIA amendments noted:
In Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink... , the Supreme Court
ruled that in camera inspection of documents withheld under section
552(b) (1) of the law, authorizing the withholding of classified informa-
tion, would ordinarily be precluded in Freedom of Information cases,
unless Congress directed otherwise. H.R. 12471 amends the present
law to permit such in camera examination at the discretion of the
court.
S. CoNF. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6285, 6287 (citations omitted).
Congress ultimately enacted H.R. 12471, thereby reversing the holding of
Mink by legislation. The reference to exemption 3 in Justice Stewart's concur-
rence, however, was untouched by the legislation and some courts have quoted
it.
50. 607 F.2d 339, 344 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert denied 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
In Goland, the appellants had requested documents that detailed the legisla-
tive history of the National Security Act and the Central Intelligence Agency
Act. Id. at 342-43. After the CIA failed to respond to their supplemental admin-
istrative appeal, the appellants filed suit to compel disclosure. During the liti-
gation, the CIA released the full text of one requested document (a transcript
of the 1947 statement of CIA Director Lt. Gen. Hoyt A. Vandenbar before the
Senate Armed Service Committee) and 80% of another (the 1948 statement of
CIA Director Hillenkoetter before the House Armed Services Committee). Id.
at 344. The appellants argued to the lower court that the deleted portions were
not protected by either exemption 1 or 3. Rather than answer the appellants'
interrogatories and submit to a deposition, the CIA moved for summary judg-
ment on the basis of its affidavits alone. Id.
51. Id. at 351. Although the court stated that the affidavit was noncon-
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that lower courts could determine by affidavits, without discov-
ery or in camera inspection of documents, that the deleted por-
tions of documents were protected from disclosure.5 2 Because
"Exemption 3 differs from other FOIA exemptions in that its
applicability depends less on the detailed factual contents of
specific documents," the court reasoned, "the sole issue for de-
cision is the existence of a relevant statute and the inclusion of
withheld material within that statute's coverage." 53
clusory, id., an examination of the language of the affidavit viewed in light of
the two exempting statutes undercuts the court's conclusion. The Central In-
telligence Agency Act, for example, protects "agency methods," but the affida-
vit refers to "methods" and "methodology" without ever presenting the factual
basis for the conclusion that the documents actually do detail intelligence
"methods." Circuit Judge Bazelon, dissenting in Goland, observed:
The affidavit filed here by the CIA ... plainly fails to supply the
information necessary to facilitate the adversary process and de novo
review. First, the affidavit speaks for the most part only of intelligence
"devices," "sources," "methods," and "operations." Essentially it par-
rots the language of the exempting statutes . . . rather than providing
the detailed description the "requesting party [needs] to present its
case effectively," . . . and a reviewing court requires to make an in-
dependent evaluation of an agency's exemption claims.
Id. at 365 (citations omitted).
More importantly, however, the CIA in Goland failed to index specifically
the document, of which 23 pages were deleted, and to explain sufficiently what
protected information each division thereof contained. Such a breakdown is
critical to the ability of courts to determine whether any unprotected portions
can be separated from the validly protected portions. The court in Goland
however, basing its decision on the unindexed affidavits, concluded that, be-
cause 80% of the documents already had been disclosed by the Agency, no re-
maining separable portions existed. See id. at 351 n.65. Criticizing this
approach, the dissent pointed out that "for want of an itemized index, it is im-
possible to determine whether all nondisclosed portions of the statement have
been described, much less properly withheld." Id.
An example of an affidavit that details the factual basis for the Agency's
conclusions in Goland and that includes an itemized index of the portions ex-
empted could read as follows. Instead of merely alleging that one document
contained "methods of procurement and supply," the Agency could have stated
more specifically:
Pages 4 through 6, paragraphs 1, 4, & 5, have been withheld. The por-
tions disclose one of many methods of procuring intelligence by
describing how an individual (whose identity is disclosed in these
paragraphs) supplied information to the Agency. The portions detail
how the individual gathered the intelligence and transmitted it to the
CIA. Names of two CIA employees are contained in these portions, as
are the code names of three intelligence-gathering operations run by
the CIA in two foreign countries. The substance of the information de-
tailed in paragraphs 4 & 5 is so specific that, if disclosed, it would allow
the public to ascertain, with near certainty, the identity of the opera-
tions and the method by which intelligence was obtained. Disclosure
of any part of the three paragraphs withheld would implicate the indi-
viduals with CIA operations in the two countries and thereby pose a
substantial risk to their safety.
52. Id. at 343.
53. Id. at 350. The court of appeals, id. n.65, quoted the portion of Justice
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In National Commission on Law Enforcement v. CIA,54 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
the appellants' contention that the Agency's affidavits were
conclusory and that, as a result, the court should order an in
camera inspection of documents. 55 After quoting from EPA v.
Mink,56 the court concluded that "[w] hen an agency has sup-
plied detailed affidavits or testimony, in camera inspection of
documents allegedly exempt from disclosure under Exemption
Three rarely will be necessary, particularly where the claim of
Stewart's concurrence in EPA v. Mink that appears in the text accompanying
supra note 49.
54. 576 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1978)
55. Id. at 1376-77. In National Commission, a private committee studying
law enforcement and social justice sued to compel the release of documents
that concerned the CIA's relationship with the International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL). The Committee sought-
(1) All policies, manuals, instructions and/or orders issued by and
to personnel or sections of the CIA, both within the U.S. and abroad,
regarding the status, funding, work of and/or cooperation with IN-
TERPOL, the International Criminal Police Organization.
(2) All correspondence between the CIA and INTERPOL, both
within the U.S. and abroad, regarding the status, funding, work of
and/or cooperation with that organization.
(3) All correspondence between officials of the CIA and agencies
within the Executive Branch, including but not exclusively limited to
the Treasury Department and its sections, the Justice Department and
its sections, the State Department and its sections, and any branches
of the Armed Forces, regarding the policies toward, work with, funding
of and/or cooperation with INTERPOL, both within the U.S. and
abroad.
(4) A list of all committees, active or not, of which the CIA is a
member and INTERPOL was a subject of discussion and/or decision.
Id. at 1372 n.1.
After limited discovery had taken place, the CIA filed affidavits which it
claimed supported its reliance on exemption 3 and moved for summary judg-
ment. Id. at 1375. One affidavit filed by the CIA for a document marked
"Number 1" read as follows:
Memo for Chairman, CCINC (Cabinet Committee on International
Narcotics Control) Working Group, Mr. Egil Krogh, Jr. from CIA em-
ployee acting within his capacity within the Working Group, dtd Nov.
20, 1972, marked "Secret," two pages with attachment. This document
consists of information concerning deliberations regarding means by
which INTERPOL collects intelligence abroad and describes intelli-
gence sources and methods. In addition, it contains the name of a CIA
employee. Attached to the memo described above is a Memo for the
Record dtd Nov. 20, 1972, containing the minutes of a meeting of the
Foreign Intelligence Subcommittee of the CCINC Working Group, con-
sisting of five pages, each marked "Secret." About one half or seven of
13 paragraphs of this document is devoted to the deliberations men-
tioned above. The remainder is not responsive to plaintif's request.
This attachment also contains the names of Agency employees.
Id. at 1377 n.6.
56. Id. at 1376 n.5. The court actually quoted from the concurring opinion
of Justice Stewart in FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 270 (1975), in which Jus-
tice Stewart quoted part of his own concurrence in Mink
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exemption touches on national security."57 The court ex-
plained that it would not second-guess the director of Central
Intelligence on national security matters.58
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, however, in effect departed from the deferential
approach of Goland in Ray v. Turner,59 a suit brought by two
individuals who sought disclosure of all CIA documents in
which their names appeared. In response to this request, the
CIA filed an affidavit similar to the one in Goland. One part of
the affidavit stated:
This document is a three-page memorandum the subject of which
is "Rennie Davis and Friends." It is essentially the debriefing report of
a sensitive intelligence source. The majority of the information con-
cerns individuals other than the plaintiffs.
This document has been denied in its entirety, primarily to protect
intelligence sources and methods since the release of any meaningful
portion would disclose the identity of the source, and further, to pro-
tect cryptonyms, names of CIA personnel and CIA organizational data.
Thus exemptions (b) (1), (b) (3) and (b) (6) apply.6 0
The Ray court held, however, that the allegations in the
Agency's affidavits regarding applicable FOIA exemptions were
conclusory and generalized and that the legislative history of
the Act did not support the district court's limited view of in
camera inspection.61 The Agency could not merely allege that
disclosure would reveal the identity of a "sensitive intelligence
source"; it had to provide the court with enough information to
facilitate a determination of whether the Agency could disclose
any segregable portion of the document without revealing the
intelligence source.62 The CIA's affidavits, the Ray court
stated, must detail the grounds for exempting the various por-
tions of the document as specifically as possible without re-
57. 576 F.2d at 1377 n.7.
58. Id. at 1377. This deferential approach has been followed by lower
courts. See Ray v. Turner, D.C. Civil 76-0903 (Jan. 1977). See also Winter v. Na-
tional Sec. Agency, 569 F. Supp. 545, 546-47 (S.D. Cal. 1983) (After the plaintiff in
Winter moved to compel the National Security Agency (N.SA) to submit a de-
tailed justification for its refusal to disclose the requested documents, the court
ordered the N.S.A. to submit a more detailed affidavit. The affidavit, however,
was viewed in camera, and the court subsequently granted summary judgment
for the N.S.A.).
59. 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
60. Id. at 1198-99 app.
61. Id. at 1195-96.
62. Id. at 1196. The FOIA provides that "[a] ny reasonably segregable por-
tion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after
deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (1982).
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vealing the intelligence source.63
In reversing the district court's decision, the court of ap-
peals in Ray appeared to abandon the notion that de novo re-
view under exemption 3 necessarily must differ from review
under the other exemptions. 64 After detailing the characteris-
tics of a de novo review under exemption 1,65 the court noted
that the same considerations "also apply to Exemption 3 when
the statute providing criteria for withholding is in furtherance
of national security interests." 66 Similarly, Circuit Judge
Wright concluded in his concurring opinion that the "propriety
and necessity of an in camera examination as part of the
court's de novo review of the relevant factual issues in Exemp-
tion 3 cases is ... essentially the same as in de novo review of
Exemption 1 cases. ' 67
63. 587 F.2d at 1197. The court concluded:
The agency must provide a reasonable segregation as to the portions of
the document that are involved in each of its claims for exemption....
[I]t is important that the affidavit indicate the extent to which each
document would be claimed as exempt under each of the exemptions.
The courts cannot meaningfully exercise their responsibility under the
FOIA unless the government affidavits are as specific as possible.
Id.
64. The movement by the District of Columbia Circuit toward a lesser de-
gree of deference to the CIA's decisions under exemption 3 can be measured
by comparing the affidavits accepted by the court in Goland with those rejected
by the court in Ray. Both parrot the language of the exempting statutes, and
both lack indexes that relate the specific justification for nondisclosure with
specific portions of the documents. In fact, the affidavit rejected by the court in
Ray as conclusory does not appear to parrot the language of the two exempting
statutes nearly as much as does the one accepted by the court in Goland as
nonconclusory. Compare 587 F.2d at 1198-99 (text of the affidavit in Ray) with
607 F.2d at 351 (excerpts from the affidavit in Goland).
65. The court explained:
The salient characteristics of de novo review in the national secur-
ity context can be summarized as follows: (1) the government has the
burden of establishing an exemption. (2) The court must make a de
novo determination. (3) In doing this, it must first "accord substantial
weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified
status of the disputed record." (4) Whether and how to conduct an in
camera examination of the documents rests in the sound discretion of
the court, in national security cases as in all other cases. To these ob-
servations should be added an excerpt from our opinion in Weissman
(as revised): "If exemption is claimed on the basis of national security
the District Court must, of course, be satisfied that proper procedures
have been followed, and that by its sufficient description the contested
document logically falls into the category of the exemption indicated."
Ray, 587 F.2d at 1194-95 (footnotes omitted).
66. Id. at 1195.
67. Id. at 1221. Moreover, the Ray court's rejection of the idea that the pro-
cedure for judicial review in exemption 3 cases is less strict than that for other
exemptions is apparent from the conspicuous absence of any reference to Jus-
tice Stewart's Mink concurrence, see supra note 49, which often had been
quoted in exemption 3 cases prior to Ray. See supra notes 53, 56.
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The Ray court relied substantially on Vaughn v. Rosen,68
an early FOIA case. In Vaughn, a professor researching the
Civil Service Commission sued the Commission under the
FOIA for withholding information about the personnel policies
of several government agencies. 69 The district court granted
summary judgment for the Commission, but the court of ap-
peals reversed and remanded the case, noting that the affida-
vits submitted by the Commission were couched in conclusory
terms.7 0 The appellate court ordered the Commission to sub-
mit a "relatively detailed analysis" of the allegedly exempt ma-
terial and an index that cross-referenced portions of documents
to the allegedly applicable exemptions.7 1 The court explained:
[C] ourts will simply no longer accept conclusory and generalized alle-
gations of exemptions, such as the trial court was treated to in this
case, but will require a relatively detailed analysis in manageable seg-
ments. An analysis sufficiently detailed would not have to contain fac-
tual descriptions that if made public would compromise the secret
nature of the information, but could ordinarily be composed without
excessive reference to the actual language of the document.
7 2
Allen v. CIA73 also reflects the lower degree of deference
developed in Ray. In Allen, the District of Columbia Circuit
held that the CIA's affidavits failed to establish that the with-
held portions of documents were protected by exemption 3.74
68. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
69. Id. at 822. While Vaughn requested the personnel policies of many fed-
eral agencies, he did not request those of the CIA. The opinion, nonetheless,
frequently has been cited in cases involving CIA withholding of documents
under exemption 3. See, e.g., Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World
Christianity, 636 F.2d 838, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Phillipi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1012
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Jaffe v. CIA, 516 F. Supp. 576, 578 (D.D.C. 1981); Medoff v. CIA,
464 F. Supp. 158, 160 (D.N.J. 1978).
70. Id. at 825.
71. Id. at 827.
72. Id. at 826-27 (footnotes omitted).
73. 636 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Allen arose out of a challenge to the
Agency's decision to withhold a fifteeen-page document containing information
about the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald during the seven weeks preceding
the assassination of President Kennedy. The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia granted a motion to dismiss based on the CIA's affida-
vits. Id. at 1289.
Allen appealed immediately; however, before the court of appeals heard ar-
guments, the CIA requested a remand to supplement the record. The request
was granted and the Agency, in district court, released some portions of the
document and fied a supplemental affidavit to justify withholding the remain-
ing portions. The district court granted summary judgment for the CIA without
having made an in camera inspection of the document. Id. Allen again ap-
pealed, arguing that the affidavits failed to establish that the portions withheld
were protected under exemption 3. Id.
74. Id. at 1300. The affidavits submitted by the CIA stated in part:
Deletions designated with the letters "A & B" on pages 4 through 9, in
paragraphs 5 through 12, show where portions were deleted to protect
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Pointing out the similarity between exemptions 1 and 3 in na-
tional security cases, the court commented: "With respect to
those portions of the document withheld under Exemption 3,
the affidavits fail to demonstrate that the portions are clearly
exempt. Indeed, the affidavits ... are no less conclusory or
nonsupportive with respect to the Exemption 3 claims than
they are with respect to the Exemption 1 claims."7 5 Conse-
quently, the court of appeals ordered the lower court to con-
duct an in camera inspection of the requested document to
determine whether it was, in fact, exempt.7 6
In dicta, the Allen court also established guidelines for
courts considering whether to conduct in camera inspections of
documents. Unlike the Goland and National Commission
courts, which would have required in camera inspections only
in rare cases,77 the Allen court apparently sanctioned more
widespread use of the device. Specifically, it suggested that in
camera inspection is most appropriate when judicially econom-
ical,78 when Agency affidavits are conclusory,7 9 when the
Agency acts in bad faith,80 when parties dispute the actual con-
tents of the documents, 81 or when strong public policy interests
against the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods. The sub-
stance in these paragraphs concern one sequence of events, which has
been the subject of a number of other documents which have been re-
leased for public access. The material is presented in such a manner,
in this document, that to name the principal figures would result in the
eventual identification of the intelligence sources who produced the in-
formation and the intelligence methods used in the process. Such a
disclosure would compromise the intelligence sources and methods in-
volved, which are currently viable and functioning.
Id. at 1292.
75. Id. at 1294.
76. Id.
77. See Goland, 607 F.2d at 350; National Commission, 576 F.2d at 1377 n.7.
78. The court observed that if there are only a few documents or if the doc-
uments are brief, an in camera inspection often is preferable because it typi-
cally would take less time than requiring more Agency affidavits or conducting
further discovery. 636 F.2d at 1298.
79. The Allen court pointed out that when the affidavits are couched in
conclusory terms or when requiring sufficiently detailed affidavits would dis-
close the very information sought to be protected, in camera inspections allow
the court to conduct a meaningful de novo review. Id.
80. In camera inspections are appropriate, the court noted, when there is
evidence that the Agency has acted in bad faith since in such circumstances all
statements by the Agency become suspect. Id. Although the Allen court did
not elaborate on what would constitute bad faith on the part of the Agency, in
Ray Chief Judge Wright remarked: "A court might suspect bad faith if an
agency failed to correct deficiencies in its affidavits when given a second
chance to be more specific, or if an agency submitted affidavits in the first in-
stance that suffered from defects pointed out in previous court decisions." 587
F.2d at 1214 n.55.
81. When courts are merely interpreting the scope of an exemption and
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warrant disclosure.82
B. CRrIcIsM OF THE APPLICATION
In the FOIA, Congress explicitly mandated that courts re-
view agency decisions de novo.83 It failed, however, to give ade-
quate guidance as to how courts should conduct the review,84
thereby inviting the inconsistency that now plagues the case
law. This lack of congressional guidance, however, is not the
sole cause of the inconsistent application of the Act's de novo
review requirement. Exemption 3 deals primarily with intelli-
gence documents, which by their nature elude meaningful re-
view. As the Senate Judiciary Committee explained:
It is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests [of secrecy
and disclosure], but it is not an impossible one either. It is not neces-
sary to conclude that to protect one of the interests, the other must, of
necessity, either be abrogated or substantially subordinated. Success
lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and
protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible
disclosure. 85
Although Congress gave little express guidance, its deliber-
ate use of the term "de novo," a standard of review reasonably
well-defined by prior case law,86 compels a stricter review than
if Congress had chosen either a "substantial evidence" or an
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. At the very least, Con-
the parties agree on the contents of the documents, the Allen court pointed out
that in camera inspections are irrelevant. Rather, inspections are most benefi-
cial when the issue of the applicability of an exemption concerns the contents
of the documents. 636 F.2d at 1298.
82. The court noted that when citizens request information concerning
whether an agency is effectively serving the public interest, the agency may
have a self-interest in withholding the information. In camera inspection al-
lows a court to insure the information truly is exempt. Id. at 1299.
Courts confronted with CIA documents allegedly exempt under exemption
3 frequently refer to the Allen considerations. See McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d
1095, 1114 (D.C. Cir.), modified, 711 F.2d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Jaffe v. CIA, 516 F.
Supp. 576, 586 (D.D.C. 1981).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (1982).
84. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
85. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
86. See, e.g., Stoner v. Presbyterian University Hospital, 609 F.2d 109, 112
(3d Cir. 1979) (a trial that is subject to a de novo review is not an appellate pro-
ceeding but an exercise of a court's original jurisdiction); National Industrial
Sand Assoc. v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 689, 699 n.34 (3d Cir. 1979) (all relevant issues
of law may be decided de novo by a court under the Administrative Procedure
Act section that provides for a lower standard of review for factual issues); Ep-
stein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.) (judicial review de novo under the
FOIA requires considering whether conditions of the exemption in truth exist),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Farmingdale Supermarket, Inc. v. U.S., 336 F.
Supp. 534, 536 (D.N.J. 1971) (a de novo review entails trying a matter anew, as if
it had not been heard before).
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gress must have intended that courts take a "hard look"87 at
the factual basis for Agency decisions to deny disclosure. Ad-
mittedly, since Congress did not grant an automatic right to an
in camera inspection,88 the de novo review mandated by the
FOIA arguably differs from the unrestricted de novo standard
employed under the Administrative Procedure Act.89 There is,
however, a fundamental difference between the standard of re-
view Congress directed the courts to employ and the proce-
dures that Congress authorized courts to use in conducting
such review. Thus, while the modification regarding in camera
inspections may limit courts hearing exemption 3 cases proce-
durally, Congress did not intend that courts defer to Agency
decisions generally. Otherwise it would have used one of the
more deferential standards in providing for judicial review.
In cases such as Goland and National Commission, how-
ever, courts have misread EPA v. Mink9O by failing to examine
Agency decisions in accordance with the traditional de novo re-
view standard. For example, the Goland court's conclusion
that exemption 3 "depends less on the detailed factual contents
of specific documents" than do the other eight exemptions9 ' is
not supported by EPA v. Mink. As Justice Stewart stated in
Mink, a court cannot question the appropriateness of the ex-
empting statute. That does not, however, prevent a court from
determining whether the exemption protects the contents of
the document, a necessary step under de novo review. When
courts review de novo the CIA's claim that a particular statute
authorizes nondisclosure under exemption 3, they at least must
take a hard look at the Agency's decision. They must first de-
cide whether the statute is, in fact, an exempting statute and
then determine, based on the facts of the case, whether the dis-
puted documents fall within the scope of the exempting stat-
87. Circuit Judge Leventhal, in reviewing an FCC license renewal, noted.
Its supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely
in case of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the
legislative charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, espe-
cially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not re-
ally taken a "hard look" at the salient problems, and has not genuinely
engaged in reasoned decision-making.
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841, 851 (footnote omitted).
88. The conference committee in 1974 explained "H.R. 12471 amends the
present law to permit such in camera examination at the discretion of the
court. While in camera examination need not be automatic, in many situations
it will plainly be necessary and appropriate." S. CONF. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6285, 6287.
89. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1982).
90. 410 U.S. 73. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
91. Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d at 350.
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ute. Although the Goland court's opinion seemed to
acknowledge this two-stage inquiry,92 the court side-stepped
the second part of its task by granting the Agency's summary
judgment motion on the sole basis of conclusory affidavits
which did not explain the factual justification for the
exemption. 93
The inability of courts adopting the Goland and National
Commission approach to conduct meaningful de novo reviews
of agency decisions is most evident in their treatment of
Agency affidavits. Had the affidavits explained in detail the fac-
tual basis for the Agency's reliance on the exempting statutes,
the courts would have been justified in relying on them. In Na-
tional Commission, however, the CIA merely stated that disclo-
sure would reveal "intelligence sources," "intelligence
methods," and Agency employees. 9 4 Likewise, in Goland the
Agency simply repeated the language of the exempting statute
by alleging that the documents would divulge intelligence "de-
vices," "methods," and "sources. '95 These conclusory claims
did not allow the courts to determine whether the withheld in-
formation was protected by the exempting statutes96 or
whether the Agency could have disclosed any reasonably
segregable portions of the documents. 97 Had the Goland and
National Commission courts instead forced the Agency to de-
tail how the documents revealed intelligence "sources," "meth-
ods," "devices," and employees, they could have conducted
meaningful de novo reviews.98
92. See id. at 350-51.
93. See supra note 51.
94. The affidavit for document #1 stated: 'This document consists of infor-
mation concerning deliberations regarding means by which INTERPOL collects
information abroad and describes intelligence sources and methods. In addi-
tion, it contains the name of a CIA employee." National Commission, 576 F.2d
at 1377 n.6.
95. 607 F.2d at 365 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). See also supra note 51.
96. By repeating in its affidavits the language of the National Security Act
(one of the exempting statutes), the Agency provided the court with no sub-
stantive information about the document from which the court could determine
whether withholding the document was justified.
97. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
98. The District of Columbia Circuit has acknowledged that the phrase "in-
telligence sources and methods" is susceptible to many different interpreta-
tions, the broadest of which encompasses more than is necessary to achieve
the Act's purpose of safeguarding national security. See Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d
562, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1438 (1984). Thus, the court ob-
served in Allen, "unless greater specificity is provided regarding the nature of
the 'intelligence sources and methods,' it is impossible for a trial court to con-
clude that withholding of portions of the document under Exemption 3 was
proper." 636 F.2d at 1294.
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The procedure for conducting in camera inspections in Go-
land and National Commission also violates the recognized
congressional intent.99 In concluding that in camera inspec-
tions are rarely justified when national security documents are
at issue, the National Commission court ignored the specific
language in the 1974 conference committee report. That report
noted that "[t]he conference substitute follows the Senate
amendment, providing that in determining de novo whether
agency records have been properly withheld, the court may ex-
amine records in camera in making its determination under
any of the nine categories of exemptions under section 552(b)
of the law."100 Thus, the de novo review process in national se-
curity cases includes in camera inspections just as it does in all
other FOIA cases. Because they failed to recognize the impor-
tance of in camera inspections as part of the overall review
framework adopted by Congress, the Goland and National
Commission courts did not apply the de novo review procedure
mandated by Congress.
In contrast, the approach developed in Ray and Allen al-
lows meaningful de novo review and implements the FOIA's
burden of proof allocation.101 That approach, which requires
the Agency to articulate the factual basis for denying a FOIA
request, enables a plaintiff to challenge the CIA's allegations in
more specific terms, thus preserving "the traditional adversary
nature of our legal system's form of dispute resolution."'0 2 As
the Ray court noted, in FOA cases the parties typically dis-
pute the nature of the documents withheld, but only the
Agency can assert confidently that the documents contain stat-
utorily protected information. The plaintiff, who lacks knowl-
edge of the full contents, is unable to rebut the Agency's
characterization. In light of the government's burden of justify-
ing nondisclosure under the Act,103 the Ray and Allen courts
properly required the Agency to explain, in reasonable detail,
how release of portions of withheld documents would reveal
protected intelligence information. 04
With respect to in camera inspections, the Allen court's
99. See supra notes 38, 88.
100. S. CoNF. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6285, 6287.
101. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
102. Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 824.
103. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
104. The Senate Judiciary Committee report on the 1974 FOIA amendments
specifically supported the approach of the court in Vaughn, relied on by the
Ray and Allen courts, of requiring the Agency to submit a detailed and indexed
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flexible plan provides courts with reasonable guidelines for ex-
ercising discretion. By suggesting situations that warrant in
camera treatment, it recognizes the congressional observation
that "in many situations it will plainly be necessary and appro-
priate" to conduct such inspections.105 Moreover, the Allen ap-
proach to in camera inspections does not necessarily risk
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive intelligence information
since courts can minimize that risk by ordering security clear-
ances for court personnel handling the documents. Although
requiring security clearances would slow the de novo review
process, it would help to insure the secrecy of the documents.
Moreover, documents inspected under exemption 3 typically
are not classified records; exemption 1 protects classified infor-
mation.106 In fact, courts rarely order security clearances in ex-
emption 1 cases. A security clearance procedure for cases
involving unclassified information being withheld under ex-
emption 3 would thus provide even more protection than that
afforded classified information under the existing de novo re-
view process. The court also could reduce the number of court
personnel handling the secret information by appointing spe-
cial masters to examine the documents. 0 7
I. CASES IN WHICH THE CIA REFUSES TO
ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF THE
DOCUMENTS REQUESTED
A. JuDiciAL APPLICATION OF EXEMPTION 3
Courts also have applied conflicting procedures in cases in
which the Agency refuses, on exemption 3 grounds, to confirm
or deny the existence of requested documents. 108 One line of
analysis of the withheld documents along with its justification for their nondis-
closure. S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974).
105. S. CoNF. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6285, 6287.
106. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (1982).
107. Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a ref-
erence to a special master in a case tried by a judge shall be made only when
required by some "exceptional condition." See generally 5A J. MOORE, W. TAG-
GART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ch. 53 (2d ed. 1984). Although
some commentators question the legality of appointing a special master in
FOIA cases, see Recent Cases, Administrative Law: Vaugh v. Rosen, 87 HARv.
L. REV. 854, 861 (1974), the trend appears to allow a court to utilize a master "in
connection with any matter arising in an action pending before it that is gov-
erned by Rule 53." 5A J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, supra, 53.05(2), at
53-67.
108. The Agency's rationale in such cases is exemplified in an excerpt from
its supplemental affidavit in Medoff v. CIA, 464 F. Supp. 158 (D.N.J. 1978):
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cases requires the CIA to submit, to the court and opposing
counsel, affidavits explaining why exemption 3 permits the
Agency to refuse to reveal whether such documents exist. An-
other assumes the requested documents exist and requires the
Agency to submit affidavits justifying their protection under ex-
emption 3.
Phillipi v. CIA1O9 demonstrates the first approach. In Phil-
lipi, the district court granted the Agency's motion for sum-
mary judgment after having conducted, without the presence of
Phillipi's attorney, an in camera examination of the Agency's
secret affidavits justifying its refusal to confirm or deny the
existence of the requested records.110 The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, point-
ing out that the in camera examination conducted by the lower
court was "without benefit of criticism and illumination by a
party with the actual interest in forcing disclosure.""' To rem-
edy this defect, the court of appeals ordered the CIA to submit
to the court and the plaintiff an affidavit explaining why the
Agency could neither confirm nor deny the existence of the
documents.l" 2
The United States District Court for the District of Colum-
As to documents concerning covert CIA activities, if any, it is axio-
matic that both their existence (or non-existence) and relevant details
(if any) must remain secret. Any listing, such as contemplated in a
Vaughn Motion, regardless of the detail and notwithstanding a with-
holding of the documents, would reveal at a minimum the existence of
the covert activity, if not some details. Thus, whenever a FOIA request
is received which inquires into an activity which, if it existed, would
constitute a covert CIA activity, then the Agency must respond by
neither confirming nor denying the existence of records.
Id. at 161.
109. 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Phillipi v. CIA, [1980 Transfer
Binder] Gov'T DisCLOSURE (P-H) T 80,188, at 80,464 (D.D.C. June 10, 1980)
(summary judgment for CIA on remand of case), affld, 655 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
110. 546 F.2d at 1012. Phillipi had requested all CIA records relating to the
Agency's alleged efforts to persuade several news organizations not to publicize
information concerning the Hughes Glomar Explorer, a large vessel publicly
registered as a research ship and owned by the Summa Corporation. Id. at
1010-11. Many newspaper accounts, however, revealed that the United States
Government actually owned and operated the ship to perform secret missions,
including the raising of a sunken Soviet submarine in the Pacific Ocean. Phil-
lipi, 655 F.2d 1325, 1327.
111. Phillipi, 546 F.2d at 1013 (quoting Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 825).
112. Id. The court explained. "As we have indicated, on remand appellees
will be asked to submit a public justification, which is as detailed as is possible,
for refusing to confirm or deny the existence of the requested records. Appel-
lant will then have the opportunity to test that justification through appropriate
discovery." Id. at 1014 n.12.
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bia followed the Phillipi approach in Gardels v. CIA."3
Gardels, a student at the University of California at Los Ange-
les, requested documents specifying any arrangements the
Agency had with the eleven campuses of the University of Cali-
fornia." 4 The CIA notified Gardels that it could not confirm the
existence of any covert CIA connections with the University." 5
Following Phillipi, the district court ordered the Agency to file
affidavits detailing how confirming or denying the existence of
documents would disclose intelligence sources and methods
protected by the exempting statute." 6
Edwards v. CIA117 evidences a second approach to CIA re-
fusals to confirm the existence of documents. Don Edwards, a
member of the House of Representatives, requested all docu-
ments the CIA had relating to the book Chile's Marxist Experi-
ment. The Agency refused to confirm or deny any involvement
with the book asserting that if any records existed they would
be protected under exemptions 1 and 3.118 The district court
agreed, finding that such documents, if they existed, would con-
tain the names of writers and publishers employed by the CILA,
the costs or expenses borne by the CIA, and the involvement of
the CIA in publishing the book. Such information, the court
held, "would directly disclose a covert program operated by the
agency, and those involved in its operation.... Accordingly,
... the information is exempt under Section 552(b) (3)."119
B. CRTCISM OF THE APPLICATION
The inconsistency evident in cases in which the Agency re-
113. 484 F. Supp. 368 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd. on other grounds, 637 F.2d 770
(D.C. Cir. 1980), on remand, 510 F. Supp. 977 (D.D.C. 1981), affd, 689 F.2d 1100
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
114. 484 F. Supp. at 369. The request was later revised to include any docu-
ments held by five named divisions within the CIA and any reports given to
congressional committees. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 370-71. In response, the CIA stated in one of its two affidavits:
If we (the CIA) adopt the practice of publicly disclosing our campus
contacts we must surely anticipate active and abrasive campaigns to
discover and expose the individuals concerned on at least some of the
campuses on which our replies are affirmative .... To deny the exist-
ence of CIA confidential contacts at a particular college or university
could through FOIA requests by the plaintiff or others result in the ul-
timate identification, by a process of elimination, of those colleges or
universities where CIA has confidential contacts.
Id. Based on the affidavits and depositions of Agency officials, the court
granted the Agency's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 372.
117. 512 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1981).
118. See id. at 691.
119. Id. at 693.
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fuses to confirm or deny the existence of documents is due par-
tially to the lack of congressional guidance regarding the de
novo review process. Nevertheless, when the CIA argues that
release of such information would impair national security, the
approach expounded in Phillipi and Gardels more closely re-
sembles the congressional notions of de novo review120 than
does the one established in Edwards. Courts should require
the Agency to submit public affidavits detailing its alleged in-
ability either to confirm or to deny the existence of the re-
quested material.
On the one hand, the Edwards approach fails to recognize
the importance of allowing the Agency to disassociate itself
from certain intelligence operations. Undoubtedly, the CIA is
involved in some covert activities that would, if the CIA admit-
ted its association, risk national security or embarrass the
United States. As the Edwards court admitted, however, the
affidavits submitted under its approach cannot explain ade-
quately the factual basis for the Agency's exemption 3 claim
without referring to specific portions of the documents.121
Thus, conclusory affidavits typically would remain the only ba-
sis of review, since inspecting documents in camera is not a vi-
able alternative because doing so would reveal whether the
documents exist.122
On the other hand, the Phillipi approach, which requires
affidavits detailing why the Agency cannot confirm or deny the
existence of the documents, allows the court to determine
whether the Agency can rely on exemption 3 and refuse the
plaintiff's FOIA request. This procedure comports with the
congressional intent in mandating de novo review that 'the ul-
timate decision as to the propriety of the agency's action [be]
made by the court" and not the agency. 123 By freeing courts
from the need to rely on conclusory affidavits, this approach al-
lows them to make an independent evaluation of the Agency's
rationale for not recognizing the requested documents.
120. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
121. See 512 F. Supp. at 692 n.3.
122. Since an in camera inspection is inappropriate, under the Edwards ap-
proach the CIA could submit affidavits stating: "Assuming such documents ex-
ist, they would contain information about 'intelligence sources,' 'intelligence
methods,' and Agency employees." See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying
text.
123. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965).
12551984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
IV. A SUGGESTED CONGRESSIONAL APPROACH
The lack of congressionally prescribed procedures for de
novo reviews of Agency decisions to withhold requested docu-
ments has led to conflicting judicial approaches to exemption 3
cases. Just as Congress in 1974 amended the ambiguous lan-
guage concerning in camera inspections, 24 so should it now ad-
dress the current controversy by modifying the language
mandating de novo review. Unfortunately, recent legislative
proposals to amend the FOIA125 largely have ignored this is-
sue.126 It remains a crucial one, however, since even proposals
that would preclude judicial review of Agency decisions regard-
ing certain kinds of documents would leave the vague de novo
review language for those decisions that remain reviewable.127
A uniform de novo procedure that specifies both the standard
that Agency affidavits must meet and when in camera inspec-
tions are appropriate would ameliorate the current problem.
Although a more objective and specific standard cannot elimi-
nate the inconsistency resulting from judicial discretion, the
disparity would be minor compared to that under the existing
statutory scheme.
124. See H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 6267, 6272-73. See also supra notes 38-40 and accompa-
nying text.
125. See supra note 11.
126. The inadequacy of the present vague de novo language has not been a
major part of the FOIA debate. Since 1979, Congress has conducted approxi-
mately seven major hearings on the FOIA. The problem was discussed, in gen-
eral terms, before the Senate Committee on Intelligence in 1981. See
Intelligence Reform Act. supra note 10, at 17 (statement of Lt. Gen. Lincoln
Faurer, National Security Agency). In 1980, the Committee on Government Op-
erations also discussed the de novo review process in general. See FOIA: CIA
Exemptions, supra note 10, at 156 (statement of Mark Lynch, ACLU attorney).
The congressional debate on the FOIA has been focused, rather, on the im-
pact of the FOIA on the Agency's intelligence-gathering capacities. In every
congressional hearing held since 1979, the major part of the discussion has
been on this subject. See FOIA Oversight Hearings, supra note 10; Intelligence
Reform Act, supra note 10; FOIA Hearings on S. 587, supra note 10; FOIA: CIA
Exemptions, supra note 10; Impact of the Freedom of Information Act and the
Privacy Act on Intelligence Activities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Legis-
lation of the House Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
127. The Goldwater-Thurmond proposal, for example, would totally exempt
from the FOIA certain designated "operational files," thereby precluding even
judicial review of Agency decisions to withhold such documents. S. 1324, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1983). The bill, however, does not modify the de novo re-
view mandate of the Act. See id. See also supra note 16 for discussion of the
bill.
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A. A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR CASES IN WHICH THE CIA
ACKNOWLEDGES THE EXISTENCE OF THE DOCUMENTS
REQUESTED
Congress should amend the FOIA to provide that if the
CIA recognizes the existence of documents related to a plain-
tiffs FOIA request, it must demonstrate in nonconclusory lan-
guage that the information is protected under exemption 3.
Under the basic scheme of the Act, documents are to be dis-
closed unless the Agency can establish that a specific exemp-
tion applies by submitting affidavits and testimony describing
the withheld documents. 28 For a true de novo review, how-
ever, courts must adhere to the congressional mandate that the
review of agency decisions be meaningful. The amendment,
therefore, should require that the affidavits describe, in suffi-
cient detail, not only which portions of the documents allegedly
are protected by exemption 3, but also the factual basis for the
exemption claim.
Congress should continue to require the disclosure of any
nonexempt portion of a document that reasonably can be seg-
regated from the exempted portions. Although some commen-
tators fear that this practice allows unfriendly foreign
intelligence agencies to "piece together" secret information,129
their concern is exaggerated. In its affidavits, the Agency can
articulate its fear that release of the allegedly segregable por-
tion would disclose sensitive material and request that the
court protect the information. The FOIA, after all, mandates
the disclosure only of reasonably segregable parts; the Act does
not permit courts to order the disclosure of documents so re-
lated to exempted information that their release would imperil
national security.
In some cases, the Agency affidavits or the oral testimony
of senior intelligence officials alone will establish that the infor-
mation withheld falls within the scope of the exempting stat-
128. See 119 CONG. REC. 6930, 6930 (1973) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
("Congress' overriding concern in passing the... FOIA ... was that disclo-
sure of information be the general rule, not the exception."). See generally 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
129. See FOIA: CIA Exemptions, supra note 10, at 28 (statement of Frank
C. Carlucci, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence) ("[I]t is also probable that
a sophisticated foreign intelligence service could piece together, from bits and
pieces of released information in one or another area, a larger portion of the
entire picture regarding a particular intelligence activity or operation."); FOIA:
Hearings on S. 587, supra note 10, at 963-73 (statement of William Casey, Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence) (discussing the dangers of disclosure and the need
for a total exclusion of the Agency from the Act).
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ute. In cases in which such evidence is not conclusive,.
however, Congress should require courts to inspect the docu-
ments in camera in order to determine whether the contents
are protected from disclosure by exemption 3.130 Although
some commentators believe in camera inspections of CIA docu-
ments and affidavits increase the reluctance of allied foreign in-
telligence services and sources to supply information to the
CIA,131 Congress already has recognized the need for such in-
spections as part of the de novo review procedure.132 Moreover,
the need to balance exemption 3 proceedings by forcing the
Agency-which typically possesses the information and has su-
perior knowledge concerning the documents-to submit to an
in camera inspection outweighs the speculated danger that
such inspections have a chilling effect on the ability of the CIA
to gather foreign intelligence.
In order to guide courts conducting in camera inspections,
Congress specifically should authorize courts to use the factors
presented in Allen' 33 and to adopt security measures. The situ-
ations described in Allen warrant in camera inspections be-
cause, in each situation, the court cannot rely satisfactorily on
the detailed affidavits. In camera inspections, however, in-
crease the risk of disclosing secret CIA documents, which may
imperil national security. Thus, Congress also should authorize
courts to require security clearances for court personnel han-
dling the documents and to appoint special masters to conduct
the in camera inspections, procedures not adopted in Allen and
not often used by courts considering exemption 3 claims. Ex-
plicit authorization to order such safety measures should dispel
judicial fears of revealing exempt material while conducting in
camera inspections.34
In addition, Congress should consider whether evidence of
bad faith by the CIA in responding to an FOIA request should
permit the plaintiff to have an attorney or expert present at the
in camera inspection.135 Exclusion of the plaintiTs attorney
130. In such situations Congress now leaves the decision of whether to con-
duct in camera inspections to the discretion of the judge. See supra note 100
and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
132. S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6267, 6287.
133. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
134. This fear was expressed by the court in Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187,
1195 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
135. Agency conduct that suggests bad faith includes imposing long delays
in processing a reasonably straightforward document request without provid-
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from an in camera inspection of documents often prevents the
plaintiff from being able to make specific challenges regarding
the Agency's characterization of the documents. 3 6 This defi-
ciency in the de novo review procedure is even more pro-
nounced in cases of Agency bad faith, since all of the Agency's
affidavits and testimony supporting nondisclosure are then sus-
pect. While inspecting the documents at issue, the court in
such cases needs the insight of an opposing counsel or an ex-
pert; it cannot necessarily rely on the knowledge gained from
the confrontation of counsel when the suspect affidavits or tes-
timony were first submitted. Therefore, the FOIA should pro-
vide that if a plaintiff offers evidence of the CIA's bad faith in
responding to the information request, the court can conduct
the inspection of documents with the plaintiff's attorney or ex-
pert present. This provision not only would allow a plaintiff to
challenge an Agency characterization of a document, but also
should deter bad faith handling of FOIA requests by the CIA.
Allowing plaintiffs counsel or an expert appointed by the
plaintiff to view the documents in camera would not increase
the likelihood of unauthorized disclosure of secret intelligence
information since the provision applies only when there is evi-
dence of bad faith on the part of the CIA and since the court
could order security clearances for all individuals inspecting
the documents. The plaintiff's need to be represented out-
weighs the risk that the plaintiff's representative will divulge
sensitive information. Moreover, the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act of 1982137 should deter the plaintiff's representa-
tive from disclosing the identity of any CIA agent.
Finally, to reduce the CIA's administrative burden and
backlog of unanswered requests,138 Congress should amend the
FOIA to allow the Agency to use either written affidavits or less
time-consuming means of proving that an exemption applies. If
the Agency could satisfy its burden of proof with the oral testi-
ing an explanation to the person requesting documents. Limiting the scope of a
search by using a cutoff date beyond which Agency personnel will not look for
documents, without informing the person requesting the search of such limita-
tion, also may indicate bad faith on the part of the Agency. See also supra note
80.
136. The Senate in 1974 recognized this deficiency and suggested that the
plaintiff's counsel be included in the in camera inspection "Whenever possible."
See S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
137. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 421 (West Supp. 1984) (making it a crime, punishable
by a fine or imprisonment or both, intentionally to disclose under certain cir-
cumstances the identity of a covert agent).
138. See supra notes 12, 13, and accompanying text.
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mony of senior intelligence officers, FOIA compliance would re-
quire less work. Consequently, some of the specialized senior
intelligence officers now answering FOIA requests instead
could devote their time to organizing intelligence information
for government policy-makers.
B. A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR CASES IN WHICH THE CIA
REFUSES TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF THE
DOCUMENTS REQUESTED
Congress also should mandate that courts, in deciding
cases in which the CIA refuses to confirm or deny the exist-
ence of documents, require the Agency, through either affida-
vits or oral testimony, to justify its exemption claim to both the
court and opposing counsel. Instead of detailing how the dis-
closure of documents would divulge intelligence sources and
methods, as suggested in Edwards, the CIA first should be re-
quired to document how acknowledging the existence of the
documents would pose a risk to national security. If the CIA
fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that such
a risk exists, the court then should require it to submit an affi-
davit detailing the justification for protecting the requested
documents, assuming they exist. This affidavit would detail the
factual basis for the Agency's exemption claim and would re-
semble the affidavits submitted by the Agency when it admits
the existence of documents.
The plaintiff could challenge the CIA's contention that the
mere acknowledgement of documents in its control would pose
national security risks by offering evidence that the Agency's
association with the disputed covert operation already has
been publicized. If the Agency already has been publicly
linked to the operation, the acknowledgement of documents by
the CIA would not damage national security. Thus, if the plain-
tiff shows prior publicity, the court should order the Agency to
submit affidavits or oral testimony that meet the standards ar-
ticulated in the second tier.
By allowing the Agency initially to articulate how its mere
acknowledgement of requested documents would disrupt na-
tional security, the CIA will have an opportunity to disassociate
itself from an intelligence operation, the mere admission of
which might embarrass the United States or disrupt its foreign
policy. If the Agency fails to cooperate in this first stage, the
court would order the Agency to submit the more factually de-
tailed affidavits. Courts may never need this second tier of the
1260 [Vol. 68:1231
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proposed procedure, but its existence should be an incentive
for the Agency to comply with the FOIA.
C. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FOTA
The following proposed amendment to 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a) (4) (B) is designed to incorporate the changes sug-
gested by this Note:
In cases in which Central Intelligence Agency justifies its withholding
of records or portions thereof under subsection (b) (3) [5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (3)], the court shall conduct its review as follows:
(i) The court shall require the Central Intelligence Agency to
demonstrate, by either affidavits or testimony, that the records or por-
tions thereof being withheld are specifically exempted by a statute
meeting the requirements of such subsection. Provided, however, that
in cases in which the Central Intelligence Agency refuses to confirm or
deny the existence of the requested records, it need not submit such
evidence regarding the records themselves if it can demonstrate, by
either affidavits or testimony, that acknowledging the existence of such
records would pose a risk to national security.
(ii) The court shall conduct an inspection of the withheld records
when the evidence submitted by the Central Intelligence Agency is too
conclusory for the court to determine either whether the records are
protected under subsection (b) (3) or whether any reasonably segre-
gable portions can be released, when the parties dispute the actual
contents of the records and the court cannot adjudicate the dispute
based on the affidavits or testimony alone, or when strong public policy
interests warrant disclosure. Such inspection shall be conducted with-
out the presence of counsel or experts, except that in cases in which
the plaintiff establishes that the Central Intelligence Agency has acted
in bad faith in responding to the plaintiff's information request for the
records at issue, the court may permit counsel or experts for both par-
ties to attend the inspection.
(iii) The court, when it deems appropriate for national security
considerations, shall require security clearances of counsel and court
personnel having access to the withheld records and appoint special
masters to conduct the inspection of such records.
This detailed de novo amendment sanctions a less deferen-
tial approach to CIA decisions to withhold documents re-
quested under the FOTA. Contrary to the premise of recent
congressional proposals to amend the FOIA,139 the Act in its
present form has not forced the CIA to disclose vital intelli-
gence information. Since the amendment to exemption 3 was
enacted in 1976, virtually no court has ordered the disclosure of
documents that the CIA claimed were protected by the exemp-
tion.140 The recent congressional proposals, which include
139. See supra note 11.
140. Lt. Gen. Lincoln Faurer of the National Security Agency testified in
1981: "While we have been fortunate in never having lost a FOIA case, we have
been forced to place far more information concerning our activities on the pub-
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measures that either would exempt all documents related to
CIA clandestine and covert operationsl 4l or would exempt the
CIA itself,142 seem unnecessarily restrictive in light of the
Agency's undefeated record in court.143
Since courts rarely, if ever, order total disclosure of docu-
ments, an important issue in exemption 3 cases is whether rea-
sonably segregable portions can be disclosed. Courts cannot
decide this vital issue, however, unless the Agency's affidavits
divide documents into portions small enough to allow informed
decisions to be made regarding segregability. Conclusory state-
ments about the document as a whole do not give the court a
basis on which to deaide what parts are segregable. Moreover,
since in camera inspections commonly result in the court's or-
dering the disclosure of segregable portions of the withheld
document, the decision of whether to conduct such an inspec-
tion often determines whether any portions of documents will
be released.
CONCLUSION
The need for secrecy in national security matters and the
desire for public disclosure of government information clash
when the CIA withholds documents under FOIA exemption 3.
The difficulty courts face in developing a workable formula that
protects intelligence information yet emphasizes the fullest re-
sponsible disclosure has led to disparate results both within
and among the federal circuits. The inability of courts to re-
solve this inconsistency warrants the enactment of an amend-
ment detailing the de novo review process for Exemption 3
cases. The suggested amendments to the FOIA, designed to
provide courts with the guidance they need when reviewing
Agency decisions under the Act, are sufficiently detailed to end
lic record than we believe to be prudent or required." Intelligence Reform Act
Hearings, supra note 10, at 17. ACLU attorney Mark Lynch testified the year
before that "in all of the many many cases which have been litigated so far
under the Freedom of Information Act there is only one case wherein Judge
Gerhardt Gesell ordered information that the CIA contended was classified to
be released, and they were just a very few fragments of information in a docu-
ment." FOIA: CIA Exemptions, supra note 10, at 79. The information in the
case referred to by Mr. Lynch ultimately was not released. See Holy Spirit
Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity v. CIA, 636 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir.
1980), vacated as moot 455 U.S. 997 (1982).
141. See S. 1235, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.; HLR. 4518, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
142. National Security, supra note 12, at 712-13 (statement of Stanley
Sporkin, CIA general counsel).
143. See supra note 140.
1262 [Vol. 68:1231
1984] FOIA EXEMPTION 3 AND THE CIA 1263
the conflicting de novo procedures, but not so overly specific as
to abrogate proper judicial discretion in exemption 3 cases.
Gregory G. Brooker
